Two recent cases, one from the Federal Court and the other from the Federal Court of Appeal, illustrate how difficult it is to meet the test for an interlocutory injunction in a Canadian trademark case.
In CMAC Mortgages Ltd. et al v. Canadian Mortgage Expert Centres Ltd. et al, Lemieux, J. of the Federal Court applied the 3-part test found in the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada Attorney General (that the applicant for an injunction must demonstrate (1) a serious question to be tried; (2) that the applicant would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction; and (3) that an assessment of which party would suffer greater harm from the granting or refusal of a remedy favours the applicant.)
The Applicant (Plaintiff), Ontario Mortgage Action Centre Ltd. c.o.b. as OMAC, had been operating a residential mortgage business in Ontario for a number of years and had several trademark registrations. The principal of OMAC had only recently incorporated CMAC Mortgages Ltd. and opened a Calgary office under the latter name.
The Defendant Canadian Mortgage Expert Centres Ltd. c.o.b. CMEC was incorporated shortly after CMAC Mortgages Ltd. and opened two offices, both in Ontario. Thus, CMAC Mortgages Ltd. and the company carrying on business as CMEC operated in different jurisdictions.
There was no evidence of actual confusion regarding CMAC and CMEC. There was, however, some evidence of actual confusion as between OMAC and CMEC, although minimal. Lemieux, J. concluded that there was a serious issue to be tried in respect of confusion and passing–off between OMAC and CMEC, but not between the other Plaintiffs and CMEC since the latter were not operating in the same marketplace.
However, the Plaintiffs had not led sufficient evidence to establish irreparable harm. According to Lemieux J. “the loss of goodwill and the resulting irreparable harm cannot be inferred. It must be established by ‘clear evidence'”. It was noted that the Plaintiffs, rather than focusing on evidence of irreparable harm had attempted to show the defendants were impecunious.
Finally, Lemieux, J. explained that his preliminary assessment of OMAC’s case was that it was weak in terms of confusion since buying mortgage services is not like buying wares off a shelf, given that the buyer of mortgage services will be more discriminating.
In Hyundai Auto Canada v. Cross Canada Auto Body Supply (West) Limited et al the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal with costs noting that the test for granting an interlocutory injunction had been clearly set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in RJR-MacDonald. The Court of Appeal also agreed with the trial judge that the evidence as to irreparable harm was essentially speculative and there was no demonstration that the harm could not be compensated in damages if the injunction was refused.
It is clear from these cases that interlocutory injunctions are very difficult to obtain. In the absence of clear evidence of irreparable harm that cannot be compensated for in damages, courts will refuse to grant the injunction.