A recent posting noted how difficult it is to obtain interlocutory injunctions in Canadian trade-mark actions. However, a judge of the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench recently concluded that the Plaintiffs in Marlborough Hotel Corporation et al. v. First Canadian Hotels & Entertainment Ltd. et al. were entitled to an interlocutory injuction. The Plaintiffs had since 1959 marketed and advertised a large ballroom at their hotel facilities as the “Skyview Ballroom”. On May 1, 2007, the Defendant, a hotel located one block away, started using the name “Radisson Winnipeg Skyview”.

The judge applied the three-part test in R.J.R. MacDonald Inc. v. Attorney General (Canada) noting also that, according to Apotex Fermentation Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd, a 1994 decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal, the three factors are not individual hurdles for an applicant to overcome, but are to be viewed as interrelated. 

The judge concluded that there was a serious issue to be tried. Although the Defendants raised numerous arguments regarding the Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success, these were matters for the trial judge to assess.

The judge also found that there would be irreparable harm, noting that there would very likely be confusion, given that the two businesses were one block apart. The judge was also satisfied that it would be difficult for the Plaintiffs to quantify or prove the extent of any damages, both financially and to their goodwill, should the Defendants be allowed to use “Skyview”. Finally, the judge was satisfied that the balance of convenience favoured the Plaintiffs, given that the Plaintiffs were a long-established business and that the Defendants had only started to use the word “Skyview” in May of 2007.

Two recent cases, one from the Federal Court and the other from the Federal Court of Appeal, illustrate how difficult it is to meet the test for an interlocutory injunction in a Canadian trademark case.

In CMAC Mortgages Ltd. et al v. Canadian Mortgage Expert Centres Ltd. et al, Lemieux, J. of the Federal Court applied the 3-part test found in the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada Attorney General (that the applicant for an injunction must demonstrate (1) a serious question to be tried; (2) that the applicant would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction; and (3) that an assessment of which party would suffer greater harm from the granting or refusal of a remedy favours the applicant.)

The Applicant (Plaintiff), Ontario Mortgage Action Centre Ltd. c.o.b. as OMAC, had been operating a residential mortgage business in Ontario for a number of years and had several trademark registrations. The principal of OMAC had only recently incorporated CMAC Mortgages Ltd. and opened a Calgary office under the latter name.

The Defendant Canadian Mortgage Expert Centres Ltd. c.o.b. CMEC was incorporated shortly after CMAC Mortgages Ltd. and opened two offices, both in Ontario. Thus, CMAC Mortgages Ltd. and the company carrying on business as CMEC operated in different jurisdictions.

There was no evidence of actual confusion regarding CMAC and CMEC. There was, however, some evidence of actual confusion as between OMAC and CMEC, although minimal. Lemieux, J. concluded that there was a serious issue to be tried in respect of confusion and passing–off between OMAC and CMEC, but not between the other Plaintiffs and CMEC since the latter were not operating in the same marketplace.

However, the Plaintiffs had not led sufficient evidence to establish irreparable harm. According to Lemieux J. “the loss of goodwill and the resulting irreparable harm cannot be inferred. It must be established by ‘clear evidence'”. It was noted that the Plaintiffs, rather than focusing on evidence of irreparable harm had attempted to show the defendants were impecunious.

Finally, Lemieux, J. explained that his preliminary assessment of OMAC’s case was that it was weak in terms of confusion since buying mortgage services is not like buying wares off a shelf, given that the buyer of mortgage services will be more discriminating.

In Hyundai Auto Canada v. Cross Canada Auto Body Supply (West) Limited et al the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal with costs noting that the test for granting an interlocutory injunction had been clearly set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in RJR-MacDonald. The Court of Appeal also agreed with the trial judge that the evidence as to irreparable harm was essentially speculative and there was no demonstration that the harm could not be compensated in damages if the injunction was refused.

It is clear from these cases that interlocutory injunctions are very difficult to obtain. In the absence of clear evidence of irreparable harm that cannot be compensated for in damages, courts will refuse to grant the injunction.

In Nada Fashion Design Inc. v. Designs by Nada et al., the Plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction against the Defendants a few days before the Plaintiff and Defendants were to participate in Toronto’s L’Oréal Fashion Week. The Plaintiff alleged that it had prior use of the trademark NADA, although it had only recently applied to register the mark, and that the Defendants’ use of BY NADA and NADA YOUSIF constituted passing-off.

The Court applied the three-part test to determine whether an interlocutory injunction was warranted:

(1) the existence of a serious issue to be tried;
(2) the existence of irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; and
(3) that the balance of convenience favours the granting of the injunction.

With regards to the first part of the test, the Court focused on whether, with regards to passing-off, there was likely to be confusion, concluding confusion was likely with BY NADA, but not with NADA YOUSIF.

However, with regards to the second part of the test, the Court decided that the Plaintiff had not provided the “clear evidence” necessary to establish irreparable harm. The Plaintiff’s allegations with regards to the importance of a brand in the fashion industry and its negotiations with major retailers was not sufficient. Thus, there was no irreparable harm and the balance of convenience favoured the Defendants.

No interlocutory injunction was granted and whether the Plaintiff continues with its action remains to be seen.

In Stenner v. ScotiaMcLeod, a recent decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court, the Plaintiff successfully established that his surname used in association with financial services was a valid trademark and that the Defendants’ use of the name constituted passing-off. 

The Plaintiff was a well-known Vancouver-based investment advisor and financial consultant with his own radio show. He worked under contract with the National Bank where investment and financial services were provided by a team that included his daughter and her husband. The daughter’s surname was Stenner-Campbell. In 2002 the Plaintiff negotiated unsuccessfully with his daughter to sell her his book of business. That book of business was instead sold to another National Bank employee for $61 million. The daughter and her husband then joined ScotiaMcLeod, a rival investment firm, began soliciting clients and started a radio show using the Stenner name. The Plaintiff then commenced an action against his daugther and her husband.

Among other relief, the Plaintiff claimed breach of fiduciary duty and passing-off and sought an injunction to prevent the Defendants from using STENNER with any of INVESTMENT, TEAM or FINANCIAL. The Plaintiff had successfully applied to register the STENNER trademark, but the application was only filed after the lawsuit was commenced.

The Court concluded that there was no breach of fiduciary duty because the daughter in particular was not a key employee of the Plaintiff’s team. Moreover, under British Columbia law, a former employee could solicit customers so long as he or she did not take and use confidential information or trade secrets of the former employer.

However, the Court also concluded that passing-off was established since the Defendants’ use of Stenner-Campbell in print and on radio created confusion, depending on the context and a person’s prior experience with the financial world. There was a benefit to be derived by the Defendants’ use of the name and the daughter did nothing to avoid confusion by also using her given name, Vanessa. However, with regards to damages, the Court reasoned that because the passing-off due to confusion with STENNER had diminished greatly over time, 10% of the Defendants’ gain to trial, and 5% for a further five years after, was the appropriate measure.

The Court also issued a permanent injunction with regards to the Defendants’ use of the domain name www.stennerteam.ca and required that domain name to be transferred to the Plaintiff. However, no injunction was issued regarding the use of STENNER with INVESTMENT, TEAM, or FINANCIAL, since it would be too broad.

The decision has now been appealed to the British Columbia Court of Appeal and we will report if there is a further ruling.