In Nada Fashion Design Inc. v. Designs by Nada et al., the Plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction against the Defendants a few days before the Plaintiff and Defendants were to participate in Toronto’s L’Oréal Fashion Week. The Plaintiff alleged that it had prior use of the trademark NADA, although it had only recently applied to register the mark, and that the Defendants’ use of BY NADA and NADA YOUSIF constituted passing-off.

The Court applied the three-part test to determine whether an interlocutory injunction was warranted:

(1) the existence of a serious issue to be tried;
(2) the existence of irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; and
(3) that the balance of convenience favours the granting of the injunction.

With regards to the first part of the test, the Court focused on whether, with regards to passing-off, there was likely to be confusion, concluding confusion was likely with BY NADA, but not with NADA YOUSIF.

However, with regards to the second part of the test, the Court decided that the Plaintiff had not provided the “clear evidence” necessary to establish irreparable harm. The Plaintiff’s allegations with regards to the importance of a brand in the fashion industry and its negotiations with major retailers was not sufficient. Thus, there was no irreparable harm and the balance of convenience favoured the Defendants.

No interlocutory injunction was granted and whether the Plaintiff continues with its action remains to be seen.

In Stenner v. ScotiaMcLeod, a recent decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court, the Plaintiff successfully established that his surname used in association with financial services was a valid trademark and that the Defendants’ use of the name constituted passing-off. 

The Plaintiff was a well-known Vancouver-based investment advisor and financial consultant with his own radio show. He worked under contract with the National Bank where investment and financial services were provided by a team that included his daughter and her husband. The daughter’s surname was Stenner-Campbell. In 2002 the Plaintiff negotiated unsuccessfully with his daughter to sell her his book of business. That book of business was instead sold to another National Bank employee for $61 million. The daughter and her husband then joined ScotiaMcLeod, a rival investment firm, began soliciting clients and started a radio show using the Stenner name. The Plaintiff then commenced an action against his daugther and her husband.

Among other relief, the Plaintiff claimed breach of fiduciary duty and passing-off and sought an injunction to prevent the Defendants from using STENNER with any of INVESTMENT, TEAM or FINANCIAL. The Plaintiff had successfully applied to register the STENNER trademark, but the application was only filed after the lawsuit was commenced.

The Court concluded that there was no breach of fiduciary duty because the daughter in particular was not a key employee of the Plaintiff’s team. Moreover, under British Columbia law, a former employee could solicit customers so long as he or she did not take and use confidential information or trade secrets of the former employer.

However, the Court also concluded that passing-off was established since the Defendants’ use of Stenner-Campbell in print and on radio created confusion, depending on the context and a person’s prior experience with the financial world. There was a benefit to be derived by the Defendants’ use of the name and the daughter did nothing to avoid confusion by also using her given name, Vanessa. However, with regards to damages, the Court reasoned that because the passing-off due to confusion with STENNER had diminished greatly over time, 10% of the Defendants’ gain to trial, and 5% for a further five years after, was the appropriate measure.

The Court also issued a permanent injunction with regards to the Defendants’ use of the domain name www.stennerteam.ca and required that domain name to be transferred to the Plaintiff. However, no injunction was issued regarding the use of STENNER with INVESTMENT, TEAM, or FINANCIAL, since it would be too broad.

The decision has now been appealed to the British Columbia Court of Appeal and we will report if there is a further ruling.

Two recent Canadian cases may be of interest to our readers.

In the first, because the Defendant had not yet used the alleged infringing trademark and because the Registrar of Trade-marks had not yet made a decision regarding the Defendant’s applications to register the mark at issue and expunge certain of the Plaintiffs’ marks, the British Columbia Supreme Court refused the Plaintiffs’ summary trial application – Price Costco International, Inc. et al. v. Welcome Warehouse Ltd.. Costco, the international “big box” retailer, alleged that the Defendant, a local British Columbia company, would be passing off and infringing the Plaintiffs’ registered trademarks (which included PRICE CLUB PRICE COSTCO, PRICE COSTCO & Design, COSTCO Design and COSTCO WHOLESALE & Design) if the Defendant proceeded to use PRICECO WAREHOUSE. The Defendant had applied to register its mark on the basis of proposed use, which the Plaintiff opposed. The Defendant also brought proceedings to expunge PRICE CLUB, PRICE COSTCO and PRICE COSTCO & Design.

Notwithstanding the Plaintiffs’ survey evidence demonstrating confusion, the court declined to grant declaratory or injunctive relief since there was no evidence of any actual infringement or damage by the Defendant.

With regard to the second case, we earlier reported the decision in Sun World International Inc. v. Parmalat Dairy and Bakery Inc. in which the prothonotary agreed with the Registrar of Trade-marks that the statement filed in opposition to the registration of a trademark could not be amended after the Registrar had decided the merits of the registration. This decision was appealed further, to a Federal Court judge, who handed down a decision in late August, agreeing with the prothonotary.

For many years, CHAPMANS has been a well-known trademark in the Vancouver clothing trade. However, the mark has been used by two companies, a situation that can lead to problems, as evidenced by a recent decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal.

In Edward Chapman Ladies’ Shop Limited v. Edward Chapman Limited the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision in favour of Edward Chapman Ladies’ Shop Limited, permanently restraining Edward Chapman Limited from selling ladies’ clothing and accessories in association with the names Edward Chapman, Chapman’s, Edward Chapman’s Limited or similar names, except where at least equal prominence is given to the additional name, Chapy’s.

In 1959, the Edward Chapman retailing clothing business in Vancouver was divided between two corporate entities: Edward Chapman Limited to continue with the sale of men’s clothing and Edward Chapman Ladies’ Shop Limited to carry on the sale of women’s clothing. The two companies cooperated in their marketing, jointly buying advertising space and clothing labels bearing the EDWARD CHAPMAN name and a crown logo until relations soured in 1982.  

In 1982, Edward Chapman Limited opened up a women’s wear division under the name CHAPY’S. Edward Chapman Ladies’ Shop Limited objected that this was contrary to the spirit of the 1959 contract that divided the two companies, but ultimately, did not pursue legal action as it understood that Edward Chapman Limited’s women’s wear business would operate under the trade name CHAPY’S. An uneasy co-existence continued until, in 2002, Edward Chapman Limited opened a new shop which sold both men’s and women’s clothing under the name EDWARD CHAPMAN LIMITED and did not use the name CHAPY’S.

In response, Edward Chapman Ladies’ Shop Limited commenced an action in April 2003 alleging that by Edward Chapman Limited using the CHAPMAN names and crown logo in association with the sale of ladies’ wear it was passing off its products and services as those of Edward Chapman Ladies’ Shop Limited in violation of section 7(b) of the Trademarks Act.

The trial judge held that Edward Chapman Ladies’ Shop Limited established the elements of its passing off action since it had developed a distinctive reputation for fine women’s clothing under its corporate name, as well as the names CHAPMAN’S and EDWARD CHAPMAN’S. Edward Chapman Limited’s decision to drop the name CHAPY’S and market women’s clothing under the name EDWARD CHAPMAN had been made primarily to take advantage of the plaintiff’s established goodwill. The plaintiff suffered damage due to the risk of harm to, and loss of control over, its goodwill or reputation.

In upholding the decision of the trial judge, the Court of Appeal held that the parties in 1959 intended Edward Chapman Ladies’ Shop Limited to receive the exclusive right to sell ladies’ wear and accessories using the EDWARD CHAPMAN and CHAPMAN’S names and Edward Chapman Limited’s dropping of the CHAPY’S name had the effect of “elbowing out” Edward Chapman Ladies’ Shop Limited or increasing the risk of confusion in the market.  Therefore, the Court of Appeal held that Edward Chapman Ladies’ Shop Limited could properly sue for passing off and the permanent injunction was the appropriate remedy. The Court of Appeal also held that having jointly used and jointly benefited from the use of the crown logo and the notation, “Established 1890”, neither party could exclude the other from using them in association with their respective businesses.