Maintained by Clark Wilson LLP

.CA Domain Names Held To Be Personal Property

A recent Ontario Superior Court of Justice decision (Court File No. CV-13-480391) has held that .CA domain names are personal property and as such are subject to the rules that govern any other type of personal property, including those against wrongful conversion.  Perhaps more importantly, the case appears to stand for the proposition that title in .CA domain names exists independently of the registration of those domain names.

17 .CA domain names were in issue,  including mold.ca and mould.ca.  All were registered by Mr. Sullivan in his own name for the benefit of a company that he co-founded with Mr. Dalrymple, called Mold.Ca Inc.  (Mold.Ca Inc.)  The business of Mold.Ca Inc., not surprisingly, involves  mold inspection and removal services in the Greater Toronto area.  Sullivan purchased the domain names using the company’s credit card but listed himself as the Registrant of all of the domain names, rather than Mold.Ca Inc., unbeknownst to Dalrymple. 

Sullivan parted ways with Dalrymple and Mold.Ca Inc. a year later, while Mold.Ca Inc. continued to carry on its business, as before.  Unbeknownst to Dalrymple, Sullivan retained the domain name registrations and the passwords for the domain name registrations and then subsequently transferred the domain name registrations to a third party (Romelus).   Once Dalrymple found out about the above events, he commenced a Canadian Internet Registration Authority (CIRA) Dispute Resolution Proceeding (CDRP) against Romelus.  The CDRP proceeding were unsuccessful because there was no evidence that the domain names had been registered by Romelus in bad faith (they hadn’t been), nor was there evidence that they were being used for other than legitimate purposes by Romelus.

Following the failed CDRP proceeding, Romelus transferred the domain names back to Sullivan and Sullivan began using them in a competing business to that of Mold.Ca Inc.  Undaunted by its loss in the CDRP, this turn of events led to Mold.Ca Inc. to commence proceedings in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.  Finding in favour of Mold.Ca Inc., the Court held that “the issue is a simple matter of property law”, whereby title to the domain names belongs to the company, which had been wrongly converted by Sullivan.  The Court therefore ordered that all of the domain names, including all administrative information and passwords, be transferred to Mold.Ca Inc.

Cigars and Alcohol: Confusing Trademarks

Tequila Cuervo, S.A.(“Cuervo“) filed an application in the Canadian Intellectual Property Office for the registration of the trademark LAZARO COHIBA based on proposed use in Canada with alcoholic beverages. Empresa Cubano Del Tabaco (“Empresa“), a distributor of tobacco related products that predominately distributes cigars and holds the COHIBA trademark, opposed the application on several grounds, including the likelihood of confusion.

The Trade-marks Opposition Board, in a decision rendered September 30, 2008, rejected all of the grounds of opposition and in doing so placed considerable weight on the fact that Empresa had not established an extensive reputation for its mark.  Also relevant was the differences between the wares of the parties, as well as the channels and trades of the parties. Empresa appealed the Board’s decision to the Federal Court of Canada, submitting new evidence with respect to the above two issues.

On the reputation issue, Empresa submitted expert evidence of Cohiba cigar’s iconic brand status, noting that this brand was featured in television shows, movies and other media forms. This evidence was corroborated by other affidavit evidence establishing that the Cohiba cigar brand had been featured in magazines and other media content that had been circulated throughout Canada. On the distinctiveness issue, expert evidence was tendered to establish that users of tobacco and alcohol often consume both products, and that the use of one involves the use of the other. On this latter issue, new evidence was submitted by Empresa showing that many stores sold both hard alcohol and cigars.

In its October 4, 2013 decision, the Federal Court, in light of this new evidence, reversed the Board’s decision and held that the test for confusion had been met. The Court first noted that Empresa’s cigar sales in Canada were not insignificant and accepted the evidence establishing that the COHIBA cigar brand had an iconic status. On this latter point, the Court noted that “personal ownership or use of the product is not essential to the awareness or knowledge of a trade-mark.”

With respect to the distinctiveness issue, the Court held that the sale of cigars and spirits in many stores across Canada was not particularly persuasive on its own. However, the Court noted that,

[t]he reason why the proximity of cigars and alcohol is important for the analysis only becomes apparent upon examination of the relationship between smoking and alcohol. This is where the [expert evidence] is very helpful.

The Court accorded significant weight to the fact that a smoker subjectively relates alcohol to cigars, and therefore, a “predisposition for confusion” exists. Moving forward, it remains to be seen how far this reasoning can be taken. Does such a predisposition exist with wine and cheese, particularly in those parts of Canada where they are available in the same store?

Thus, the iconic status of COHIBA, coupled with the close relationship between sales of alcohol and tobacco led the Court to conclude that there was confusion.

Amendments to Trade-marks Act Re-introduced in Parliament

On October 28, 2013, the government introduced Bill C-8, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act and the Trade-marks Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts.  The short title of Bill C-8 is the Combating Counterfeit Products Act

Bill C-8 is the same as Bill C-56 which was introduced in the previous session of Parliament but did not proceed when Parliament was prorogued.  We previously commented on Bill C-56

Bill C-8 will likely move quite quickly through the House of Commons.  It has already passed second reading and will now go to the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology.

 

Bodum: Appeal Court Affirms Trademark Distinctiveness Analysis

An earlier blog commented on the Federal Court’s decision in  Bodum USA, Inc. v. Meyer Housewares Canada Inc.  Bodum commenced an action for infringement, passing off and depreciation of goodwill against Meyer, which counterclaimed for a declaration that Bodum’s registration was invalid.  Bodum’s action was dismissed and the registration expunged.

The Court of Appeal has now affirmed this decision, noting that this is “essentially a distinctiveness case” and quoting statements from the trial decision that “‘French press’ is and was at all relevant times a common name for the type of non-electric coffee making device” and “the registration is invalid because the term was and is in ordinary and bona fide commercial use as a generic term”.

MACDIMSUM: Challenging a Family of Marks

In Cheah v. McDonald’s Corporation, the Federal Court of Canada held that MACDIMSUM is likely to be confusing with the MacDonald’s family of trademarks.  Focusing on the evidence presented, the Court distinguished several earlier cases in which McDonald’s failed to preclude other businesses from using the MC or MAC prefix, including McDonald’s Corporation v. Silcorp Ltd (1989) and McDonald’s Corporation v. Coffee Hut Stores Ltd (1996), where McDonald’s failed to prevent the use of MAC for convenience stores and MCBEAN for a coffee business.  In Cheah, the Applicant, who was self‑represented, did not meet the onus on him to prove the mark was registrable.  It was also important that the application was simply for the word MACDIMSUM and not for that word in any particular type style or in combination with any other word or design.  Since a proposed use application was at issue, the Court stated that it must remain open to the fact that the trademark could potentially be used in any type style, with any combination of words or design, and in any trade environment as may present itself from time to time.

The Applicant failed to present any evidence of actual use and during cross‑examination he acknowledged he had not yet finalized plans regarding use.  McDonald’s’ evidence focused on its family of marks and included affidavits regarding McDonald’s “four score” trademarks, use and advertising in Canada, as well as an expert survey. 

In dismissing the appeal, the Court stated that the evidence presented regarding use or intended use is critical to a decision such as this.  While the respondent McDonald’s Corporation presented considerable evidence to oppose the registration of the word MACDIMSUM, the Applicant presented little probative evidence throughout the proceedings.  The Court also accepted the survey that McDonald’s presented, which involved showing certain members of the public a card bearing the word MACDIMSUM, and others a card bearing the word MAZDIMSUM.  Based on the results, the expert concluded that a statistically significant portion of consumers would identify the McDonald’s as the source of the MACDIMSUM food products.

The Court also found that the Applicant’s evidence of the use of MC and MAC in other jurisdictions was largely hearsay and did not establish dilution in Canada.  Finally, the Court found no merit in the Applicant’s assertion that he was being bullied, noting that the McDonald’s counsel was proper and courteous.  Instead, a hint of the Applicant’s true intention was to be found in a letter in which he suggested the possibility of “a global MACDIMSUM partnership”.

A Clearly Descriptive Engineering Trademark

In the recent case of Continental Teves AG & Co v. Canadian Council of Professional Engineers, the Federal Court of Canada dismissed an appeal of the Trade-mark Opposition Board’s refusal to register a mark.  The original application was brought by Continental Teves, a foreign corporation, to register the words ENGINEERING EXCELLENCE IS OUR HERITAGE for use as a trade-mark in Canada in association with wares, namely brake pads and rotors for land vehicles.  The Canadian Council of Professional Engineers (the “Council”), a national organization of the 12 provincial and territorial associations that license and regulate Canadian engineers, opposed the application.  It is the Council’s policy to oppose trademarks which consist of or include the term “engineering” in order to both protect the integrity of the titles of Canadian engineering professionals and to protect the public.

At issue on the appeal was whether the Hearing Officer erred in finding that the mark:

1. Was not clearly descriptive of the character or quality of the wares, based on section 12(1)(b) of the Trade-Marks Act;

2. Was deceptively misdescriptive of the character or quality of the wares, based on section 12(1)(b) of the Act; and

3. Was not distinctive of the wares based on the section 2 definition of “distinctive”.

Regarding the section 12(1)(b) prohibition on registering “clearly descriptive” and “deceptively misdescriptive” marks, the Court came to the same result, that the mark was not registrable, although for opposite reasons.  A mark is not registrable if it is either “clearly descriptive” or “deceptively misdescriptive”.  Whereas the Hearing Officer found the mark to be not clearly descriptive yet deceptively misdescriptive of the persons employed in the production of the wares, the Court found the converse – that the mark was “clearly descriptive” yet not “deceptively misdescriptive”.

Informing this reversal was the additional affidavit evidence from one of Continental Teves’ vice presidents, stating that the company employs a substantial number of engineers in the production of the wares in question and had done so for decades.  However, the Court also noted that nothing in the evidence established whether Canadian engineers were involved although it appeared that none were.  This additional evidence was enough to change the mark’s characterisation from “not clearly descriptive” to “clearly descriptive”  since it established that engineers were involved and the mark was therefore a clear description of the manner in which the wares are designed and produced.  Nothing in the evidence established whether the engineers involved were Canadian, but this did not matter since there was no evidence indicating or suggesting that the average consumer, on encountering the mark, would believe the wares were designed or produced by Canadian engineers.  Thus, the mark was not deceptively misdescriptive according to the Court.  The decision appears to be at odds with the earlier decision in Canadian Council of Professional Engineers v. Kelly Properties LLC, but in that case the Applicant was seeking to use KELLY ENGINEERING RESOURCES in association with employment services, which implied that Canadian engineers were involved since the services were being offered in Canada and only a licensed Canadian engineer could offer such services.

The Court came to the same result as the Hearing Officer on the finding of a lack of distinctiveness, noting that distinctiveness is “the very essence of a trademark” since it allows a consumer to identify the source of goods.  Continental Teves failed to meet its onus to prove the mark was distinctive of the wares in the face of the Council’s evidence showing the use of the phrase “engineering excellence” in Canada and abroad in multiple contexts.

Finally, the Court noted the Council was “zealous” in protecting the exclusivity of the words “engineer” and “engineering”, although this was not an endorsement or disapproval of the approach but only an observation regarding the policy.

Trademark Evidentiary Issues / Colour as a Trademark

JTI Macdonald TM Corp. v. Imperial Tobacco Products Limited, a recent decision of the Federal Court, includes interesting findings regarding the introduction of additional evidence on appeals, colour constituting a trademark rather than a distinguishing guise and the evidence necessary to establish non-distinctiveness.

Imperial Tobacco applied to register “the colour orange applied to the visible surface of the packaging as shown in the attached drawing”, namely a drawing of a cigarette package.  JTI-Macdonald opposed the application and, being unsuccessful before the Opposition Board, appealed to the Federal Court.  The Federal Court agreed with the Board and rejected the various grounds of opposition.

The Court applied a standard of reasonableness, rather than correctness, when considering the appeal, given that the issues were mixed fact and law and within the expertise of the Board.  On an appeal from the Opposition Board a party is entitled to introduce new evidence and if that evidence would have “materially affected” the Board’s findings, the standard of review is one of correctness.  However, in this case, the Court concluded that the additional evidence that JTI-Macdonald sought to introduce merely provided additional examples of products rejected by the Board in its analysis of distinctiveness and therefore would not have affected the Board’s decision. 

The Court also considered the issue whether the applied for colour formed part of a mode of wrapping or packaging so as to constitute a distinguishing guise.  The Court noted that what was applied for was the colour orange applied to the packaging.  The colour was claimed separately and was not just an element of the packaging. Thus, the Board reasonably concluded that the colour was not part of the wrapping or packaging and could be claimed alone as a trademark.

With regards to the evidence necessary to establish distinctiveness, the Court noted that the relevant date for establishing a lack of distinctiveness is the date of the filing of the opposition.  Some of JTI-Macdonald’s evidence was from the period prior to the date when the opposition was filed and was therefore not probative.  As well, a number of the products relied on by JTI-Macdonald to establish non-distinctiveness either lacked sales data or had very low sales figures and did not assist.

In the end none of the grounds of opposition were accepted by the Board or the Court and the trademark was allowed to proceed to allowance.