Trademark Expungement Proceedings: Standing as a “Person Interested”

In McCallum Industries Ltd. v. HJ Heinz Co. Australia Ltd., the Federal Court dismissed the applicant’s action to expunge the respondent’s trademark under s. 57(1) of the Trade-marks Act.

Both the applicant and the respondent produced canned and processed meat products in Canada, the applicant under the name “PALM & Device“, and the respondent under the name “OX & PALM”. The applicant was granted a trademark in July 2003, while the respondent was granted a trademark in October 2005.

Section 57(1) allows “any person interested” to apply to the Federal Court for an order that any entry in the register be struck out or amended on the grounds that at the date of the application the entry as it appears on the register does not accurately express or define the existing rights of the person appearing to be the registered owner of the trademark. The applicant sought expungement of the respondent’s trademark on the grounds that the trademark was confusing to the public, that the respondent was not the person entitled to secure registration of the trademark, and that the trademark was non-distinctive.

The Court dealt first with the issue of whether the applicant was a “person interested” such that it had standing under s. 57(1). The phrase “person interested” is defined in s. 2 of the Trade-marks Act. A corporation such as the applicant is a “person interested” if it may be affected by any entry on the register or reasonably apprehends that it may be affected by any act or omission, or contemplated act or omission under or contrary to the Trade-marks Act. Ultimately, the Court found that the applicant was not a “person interested” because the applicant did not initially oppose the registration of the respondent’s trademark, because it waited until near the end of the 5-year deadline provided by s. 17(2) of the Trade-marks Act, and because it did not establish that its business had suffered as a consequence of the registration of the respondent’s trademark. Simply carrying on the same business and targeting the same consumers were found to be insufficient to show that the applicant was affected by the respondent’s trademark. In addition, the court found that the nearly five-year delay in bringing the action was indicative that the respondent’s trademark did not cause the applicant to suffer any harm.

Despite the Court’s finding that the applicant was not a “person interested”, it acknowledged the de minimis threshold for that issue and proceeded to discuss the remainder of the applicant’s claims. In considering whether the trade-marks of the applicant and the respondent were confusing, the Court applied the test in s. 6(5) of the Trade-marks Act. In addition to finding that the two trademarks bore little resemblance to one another in appearance, sound and idea, the Court also found that the co-existence of the two trademarks in the United States since 1998 was support for the conclusion that the trademarks did not create confusion.

The Court concluded by finding that the respondent’s trademark was distinctive both because it was adapted to distinguish, and because it actually distinguished. This finding was based on the uniqueness of the respondent’s trademark and the fact that it was a recognized brand name within its target community.

The Court was satisfied that the Respondent was the person entitled to secure the registration of the OX & PALM trademark. The applicant’s claim was dismissed with costs.

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Trademark Interlocutory Injunction Denied to Target

In Target Brands Inc. v. Fairweather Ltd., the Federal Court of Canada refused to grant the interlocutory injunction sought by the American retail chain, this recent application being part of a continuing battle.

In 2002, Target’s counsel initiated proceedings under s. 45 of the Trade-Marks Act to cancel INC’s trade-mark registration for TARGET APPAREL. The Registrar of Trade-marks issued a notice on April 2002 requiring INC to show use of the trade-mark registration in Canada. INC filed an affidavit on its use of the trade-mark in response to the s. 45 notice. The Registrar of Trade-marks held that the evidence was insufficient to show use. INC appealed the Registrar’s decision and the Federal Court reversed that decision on October 19, 2006. Target’s counsel appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal, which affirmed the Federal Court decision on November 26, 2007.

Target claimed that they only became aware of INC’s use of TARGET APPAREL as a store name in June 2010. Its counsel sent a letter to INC objecting to the use of the TARGET trade name on August 3, 2010. Again, Target commenced a s. 45 proceeding to cancel the trade-mark registration of TARGET APPAREL. The Registrar of Trade-marks has issued another notice to INC under s. 45 of the Trade-marks Act on July 30, 2010, and the proceeding is currently underway.

Target also requested an injunction for the months leading up to the trade-mark dispute trial, scheduled to begin in November 2012.

The Court set out and applied the three-step test for applications for interlocutory injunctions. Although the Court found the first requirement of a serious question to be tried had been met, the question of irreparable harm to the Plaintiff was answered in the negative.
The Court found the Plaintiff’s submission on irreparable harm, advanced on the basis of a marketing theory about “sincere” and “exciting” brand personalities, difficult to assess. The Court noted, where expert evidence is provided by affidavit and is challenged in the course of the proceedings, the assessment of such expert evidence is best left for the fullness of a trial where review of qualifications and in-court testimony, direct, cross-examination and redirect, are present.

In deciding the question of irreparable harm, the Court held that the level of confusion among prospective customers to be a matter of debate, the expert opinions required closer examination and assessment, and the time to trial was relatively short. Resultantly, Target had not proved on balance of probabilities that it would suffer irreparable harm during the intervening months until a decision is rendered at trial.

The Court further considered the issue of the balance of convenience and determined that the balance favoured INC. In looking back upon the chain of events, the Court noted that INC did not begin expansion with the Target Apparel stores until after the Federal Court of Appeal decision in its favour. At that point, Target had not yet announced its expansion into Canada. The Court held that INC’s decision was not the sort of risk that should be met with the Court’s disapproval. They had taken precautionary steps in the face of Target’s claims: they had inscribed a red maple leaf in a circle rather than using a red bull’s-eye; posted a disclaimer to the effect that it is not Target; and undertaken to maintain records of sales while the litigation is continued. 

No evidence was presented to suggest that Target would be prevented or delayed from opening Target stores in Canada, but the granting of the requested injunction would result in INC having to remove and replace its signage for all stores. Such removal and replacement would not only be costly, but may also suggest instability to INC’s customers, having significant consequences for the company. Consequently, the balance of inconvenience, as it was described by the Court, lay with INC rather than Target. Presumably the matter will now proceed toward trial in November 2012.

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Counterfeit Goods: Significant Statutory and Punitive Damages

We have been following the line of cases dealing with counterfeit goods and the resulting damage awards, and note the most recent case from the Federal Court makes clear that a tougher approach to trademark  and copyright infringement can now be expected in Canada.  In Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Singga Enterprises (Canada) Inc., the Court awarded significant damage awards as well as punitive damages against the three defendant companies and their principals.

The Plaintiffs, Louis Vuitton and Burberry, hired a number of investigators to attend the stores and warehouses of the defendants Singga Enterprises Canada, Altec Productions and Guo (doing business as Carnation Fashion Company), as well as purchase items from their websites. While in attendance at the stores and warehouses, the investigators were shown and purchased a number of counterfeit items including handbags, sunglasses and jewellery, all of which contained unauthorized productions of the Louis Vuitton and Burberry trade-marks. The Plaintiffs were successful in showing that the defendants’ activities of manufacturing, importing, distributing, offering for sale and actual sale of bulk quantities of counterfeit and/or infringing items had been ongoing and, in the case of one of the defendants, had continued after the commencement of the proceeding and the motion for summary trial brought by the Plaintiffs.

The Court noted that none of the defendants, with the exception of the defendant Guo, had filed any materials in response to the motion or attempted to cross-examine any of the Plaintiffs’ affiants on their affidavits. Additionally, none of the defendants, again with the exception of Guo, had attended the hearing of the matter.

Following cases such as Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Lin Pi-Chu Yang and Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. et al v. 486353 B.C. Ltd., the Court took a tough stance toward the defendants.  Noting the defendants’ knowing and wilful behaviours, the Court awarded damages for trade-mark infringement of $30,000 for each instance of infringement against the Singga defendants and defendant Guo. Resultantly, the Singga defendants were found liable for a total of $300,000 to the Louis Vuitton Plaintiffs and $180,000 to the Burberry Plaintiffs, and the Guo defendant was required to pay $180,000 to the Louis Vuitton Plaintiffs and $120,000 to the Burberry Plaintiffs.

With regard to the Altec defendants, the evidence showed a high level of importation and inventory turn-over and was held to warrant an award of damages on a turn-over basis rather than simply a per instance basis of infringement. The Altec defendants were required to pay $480,000 in damages to the Louis Vuitton Plaintiffs, and $480,000 to the Burberry Plaintiffs. Additionally, the Singga and Altec defendants were found jointly and severally liable for the activities of the Altec defendants, for which the Singga defendants received a commission, and were required to pay $60,000 to the Louis Vuitton Plaintiffs and $60,000 to the Burberry Plaintiffs.

In addition to the damages awarded for the defendants’ infringement of the Trade-marks Act, Louis Vuitton was found to be entitled to recovery of damages and profits, pursuant to the Copyright Act, in relation to infringement by each of the groups of defendants. Statutory damages for copyright infringement were awarded at the high end of the scale due to the defendants’ bad faith conduct, which was found to be dismissive of law and order, and demonstrating a necessity for deterring future infringements. The Court awarded a total of $40,000 per group of defendants.

Additionally, the Court found that the Plaintiffs were entitled to punitive and exemplary damages as against each of the defendants. Following the earlier cases referenced above, which held that punitive and exemplary damages may be awarded where a defendant’s conduct is “outrageous” or “highly reprehensible” and with little regard for the legal process, the Court awarded punitive and exemplary damages against each of the defendants. The Louis Vuitton Plaintiffs were awarded $200,000 against the Singga defendants, $250,000 against the Altec defendants, and $50,000 payable by the defendant Guo.

Finally, citing the Louis Vuitton cases mentioned above, the Court awarded solicitor and client costs due to the defendants “disrespectful disregard” for the process of the Court, and the higher legal fees and disbursements incurred by the Plaintiffs as a result.

An appeal has now been filed by the Singga defendants, which means that there may eventually be a Federal Court of Appeal decision regarding the awards. We will continue to follow this story.

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About the Blog

The authors of the Canadian Trademark Blog are all members of the Canadian law firm Clark Wilson LLP, based in Vancouver, Canada. Each author's practice focuses–either in whole or in substantial part–on Canadian intellectual property law. Together, they manage the trade-mark portfolios of local, national and international brand owners in nearly all industries and markets.

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