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Nuthin’ but a Leaf Thang – Toronto Maple Leafs take issue with Snoop Dogg’s trade-mark application for LEAFS BY SNOOP Logo

Maple Leaf Sports & Entertainment Partnership (“MLSE”), the parent company of the National Hockey League’s Toronto Maple Leafs, has requested an extension of time to oppose a U.S. trade-mark application filed by one Calvin Broadus – better known as Snoop Dogg (“Snoop”) – for a logo featuring the words LEAFS BY SNOOP on a leaf-shaped background.

MLSE is the owner of numerous trade-mark applications and registrations in Canada and the U.S. for different iterations of the Toronto Maple Leafs logo, for use with a variety of clothing and souvenir related goods.

For side-by-side comparison, below is Snoop’s logo next to the most recent version of the Toronto Maple Leafs logo.

Mark Image               Mark Image

Snoop’s application covers the goods “cigarette lighters not made of precious metals”.  Snoop also owns a word mark application for LEAFS BY SNOOP, although that application will not be published for opposition by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office until July 19, 2016.

More information about Snoop’s LEAFS BY SNOOP products is available at his website dedicated to that brand.  Interestingly – and perhaps not surprisingly – the products on the website appear to be cannabis and food products including cannabis.

Snoop also owns a Canadian application to register the words LEAFS BY SNOOP for a broader category of goods, including clothing-related products, edible oils, jams, candies, and live plants.  (Although the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (“CIPO”) is usually known for being strict when it comes to the specificity of goods listed in trade-mark applications, in this case, it did not ask Snoop to provide further specificity as to the “edible oils and jams”, nor the “live plants”.)

Snoop’s Canadian application was advertised for opposition on June 8, 2016.  At this time, it is unclear whether MLSE has opposed – or requested an extension of time to oppose – Snoop’s Canadian application.

TSN, the source that broke news of this potential dispute, reached out to lawyers for both MLSE and Snoop, but did not receive a response.  An IP lawyer at the New York University School of Law provided TSN with his thoughts on the matter, generally opining that MLSE would likely face a tough road should it proceed with its opposition in the United States.

The intersection of pop culture and trade-marks is always a fascinating topic for us here at the Canadian Trademark Blog, and we will be watching with interest to see if this leads to an actual opposition-izzle.

New Fee Proposal for Trademarks in Canada

The Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) has published a Fee-for-service proposal (the Proposal), seeking public input by July 5, 2016.  As previously reported on this blog, the Canadian government significantly amended the Trade-marks Act (the Act) in 2014, in order for Canada to accede to the Singapore Treaty, the Nice Agreement and the Madrid Protocol. Those amendments have not yet come into force, however, pending the adoption of new Regulations on various matters, including fees.  The Proposal is the first step in adopting new Regulations on the fees that will be applicable.

The two most significant changes in the Proposal are that:

– there will be one fee payable at the time an application is filed with CIPO, while the current requirement for payment of a registration fee will be done away with; and

– the application fee will include only one Nice Class of goods or services.  Additional fees will be payable for each additional Class of goods/services that an applicant wishes to include in the application.

The proposed fees themselves will be in line with what applicants are currently used to in Canada, with reductions in some cases, particularly if the application covers only one Class of goods/services.  Having said that, applications that contain more than two Classes of goods/services will face higher fees.  Renewals will similarly be based on the principle of one fee for one Class of goods/services, with additional fees payable for additional Classes of goods/services.  There will also be additional fees payable for applications and renewals that are filed on paper as opposed to online.

Also included in the Proposal are new proposed service standards for issuance of Filing Notices and processing of Renewal requests. The Renewal request processing standard will be different, depending on whether or not the goods/services have previously been grouped into Nice Classes.

CIPO has asked for public input on the Proposal by July 5, 2016 and depending on what complaints might be received by then, an independent advisory panel could be appointed by August 15, 2016.  We will publish further posts regarding the status of the Proposal as matters progress.

Proposed New French Language Requirements in Québec

As discussed in our previous blog entry, after losing the battle in court over the requirement that businesses must add French language to English trade-marks displayed on signage outside their stores, in June 2015 the Québec government announced its intention to make modifications to Québec’s Regulation respecting the language of commerce and business (“Regulation”).

As recently reported in the media, the Québec government has just announced the proposed changes to the Regulation, the stated purpose of which is to ensure that commerce in Québec has more of a French language presence. The proposed changes require businesses to ensure that when trade-marks in languages other than French are used on exterior signage (as defined by the proposed rules), a French language component is displayed on the site as well. The proposed amendments set out the circumstances in which the new rules will apply, including when the trade-mark is displayed on interior signage that is intended to be seen from the outside, or when exterior signage is located in a mall or shopping centre complex.

The French language component may take the form of a slogan, a generic term or description, or other information concerning the products and services offered by the business. The proposed rules do not require that the French component be predominant over the non-French trade-mark, but they require that the French component be permanently visible in a manner similar to that of the non-French trade-mark being displayed, and be legible in the same visual field as the trade-mark.

A helpful illustration of acceptable and non-acceptable signage under the proposed changes can be found here.

A 45 day period for public feedback on the proposed amendments commenced on May 4, 2016. We will report again when there is a further update. In the meantime, brand owners using trade-marks in languages other than French in Québec should start considering how they will comply with the new French language requirements, assuming those requirements are passed into law, and whether their proposed strategy necessitates any changes to their current Canadian trade-mark portfolio.

 

 

Federal Court of Appeal considers “special circumstances” in appeal of trade-mark expungement

In a recent decision of the Federal Court of Appeal (“FCA”), the FCA took the rare opportunity to consider an appeal from a section 45 expungement proceeding. In One Group LLC v Gouverneur Inc, the FCA reviewed the Registrar’s decision not to expunge One Group LLC’s (“One Group”) trade-mark registration for STK (the “Mark”) on the basis of non-use, as well as the subsequent Federal Court (“FC”) decision to overturn the Registrar’s ruling.

One Group operates high end restaurants using the Mark outside of Canada.  In preparation for a new restaurant in Toronto, One Group registered the Mark in Canada. However, due to failed discussions with hotels and developers, a Toronto restaurant never materialized.

In due course, Gouverneur Inc. (“Gouverneur”) brought a section 45 proceeding, alleging that One Group failed to use the Mark in the three preceding years. The Registrar refused to expunge the Mark on the basis that there were special circumstances that excused the non-use, namely that the non-use was not in the control of One Group, and that there was evidence that One Group was close to coming to an agreement with a hotel chain which would see the Mark used in Canada.

Gouverneur appealed to the FC on the basis that the Registrar misunderstood or misapplied the test for special circumstances. The FC agreed and overturned the decision of the Registrar on the basis that it was not a reasonable finding that special circumstances excused the non-use of the Mark, and ordered the Mark expunged.

One Group then appealed to the FCA. In a relatively brief decision, the FCA allowed the appeal and reinstated the ruling of the Registrar.

This decision highlights a number of points:

  • First, the FCA emphasized that deference must be given to the Registrar in expungement proceedings, as well as in those instances where the Registrar is applying its “home statute”. As a result, courts should not disturb the Registrar’s findings of fact except in those circumstances where such findings are clearly not correct.
  • Second, it appears that there is a general willingness of the Registrar to preserve registrations. Hence, to the extent the Registrar makes factual findings in support of preserving a registration, the court’s deference to those findings on an appeal presents a potentially difficult hurdle to overcome.
  • Third, this case is a reminder that there is a “special circumstances” exception to non-use which can be used to preserve registrations. The criteria for determining if “special circumstances” exist are:

– the length of time during which the trade-mark has not been used;

– whether the reasons for non-use were beyond the registered owner’s control; and

– whether the registered owner has a serious intention to shortly resume use of the trade-mark.

Whether special circumstances exist will be determined by the Registrar from the evidence. Such findings, as stated above, will be given deference by the courts.

With this deference in mind, the FCA found no error in the Registrar’s decision that justified judicial intervention, and restored the decision of the Registrar.

Canada’s Federal Court of Appeal Provides Welcome Guidance on Geographically Descriptive Trademarks

Canada’s Federal Court of Appeal (the “Court of Appeal”) has recently had the opportunity to clarify the test for  registrability of geographically descriptive trademarks in two separate decisions. The most recent of these is the decision in MC Imports Inc. v. AFOD Ltd., 2016 FCA 60.  In the proceedings underlying the appeal, MC Imports Inc. (“MC Imports”) brought an action for infringement against AFOD Ltd. (“AFOD”) on the basis that AFOD’s use of the words “Lingayen Style”, which appeared on AFOD’s imported Philippines food products in a relatively small font, infringed MC Imports’ registered trade-mark LINGAYEN. MC Imports’ registration issued in 2003 and covered Filipino food products, including fish sauce and fish paste. Invoking the old adage that the best defence is a good offence, AFOD counterclaimed and sought to invalidate MC Imports’ LINGAYEN registration on the basis that it was either clearly descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of the place of origin of the claimed goods and therefore not registrable under the Trade-marks Act, and also on the basis that it was not distinctive of MC Imports as the source of the claimed goods.

The lower court (the “Federal Court”) found that LINGAYEN was the name of a geographical location in the Philippines, known for bagoong products; that the LINGAYEN brand goods of MC Imports originated from Lingayen; and that the ordinary consumers of those products were Canadians of Filipino or South East Asian origin.  The Federal Court ruled in AFOD’s favour and declared the registration for LINGAYEN invalid on the basis that it is clearly descriptive of the place of origin of the goods.  However, the Federal Court declined to settle the issue of whether the perspective of the “ordinary consumer” is relevant to a finding that a trade-mark is clearly descriptive of place of origin on the basis that, in this case, the end result would have been the same. On the issue of distinctiveness, the Federal Court also found in AFOD’s favour and held that the mark had not acquired sufficient distinctiveness in Canada through long term advertising and use by MC Imports. Accordingly, the Federal Court ordered that the LINGAYEN registration be struck from the Register.

On appeal, the key issues reviewed by the Court of Appeal were the appropriate legal test for assessing a finding of clear descriptiveness of a place of origin and the definition of the relevant “ordinary consumer”.  In dismissing the appeal of MC Imports and upholding the Federal Court’s decision, the Court of Appeal found that the perspective of the ordinary Canadian consumer is not always relevant for a finding that a mark is clearly descriptive of its place of origin. The Court of Appeal went on to clarify the legal test to be followed when assessing whether a trade-mark is clearly descriptive of place of origin, setting out a three-step assessment:

(1) whether the trade-mark is the name of a geographic place. The Court of Appeal stated that if the primary meaning of the trade-mark is as a geographic place, it was not relevant whether the place was known to Canadian consumers.  If there is more than one meaning (other than geographic) attached to the trade-mark, then the perception of the relevant “ordinary consumer” comes into play in determining the primary meaning of the trade-mark;

(2) whether the goods or services associated with the trade-mark originate from that geographic place. If the goods/services do not originate from that geographic place, the analysis switches to whether the trade-mark is deceptively misdescriptive; and

(3) an assessment of the trade-mark owner’s claims of use, if any. The Court of Appeal concluded that since registration of a descriptive trade-mark can be obtained under Section12(2) of the Trade-marks Act if the trade-mark had become distinctive at the time of filing the application for registration, the perception of the relevant “ordinary consumer” becomes significant at this stage. The Court of Appeal noted that MC Imports’ evidence of use in Canada, although spanning a long period of time (since 1975), was insufficient to support a finding of acquired distinctiveness.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the Federal Court that the ordinary consumer whose perspective should be considered is not the general public in Canada, but the person who would ordinarily buy the products or services associated with the trade-mark. In this case, the actual consumer would have been Canadians of Filipino or South East Asian descent.

The Court of Appeal found that MC Imports’ registration for LINGAYEN was invalid and not distinctive, and dismissed the appeal.  In doing so, the Court of Appeal pointed out that the name of a geographic place “should remain open to all producers of goods and services to describe the origin of what they are selling, even if the ordinary consumer might not be previously familiar with that place”.

This decision comes close on the heels of Lum v. Dr. Coby Cragg Inc., 2015 FCA 293, another Court of Appeal decision on the issue of clear descriptiveness of place of origin in which the registration for OCEAN PARK – registered in association with dental services performed in the Ocean Park neighborhood in Surrey, BC – was similarly invalidated.  While the OCEAN PARK decision was not referred to in the LINGAYEN decision, the analysis and conclusions were similar and serve to consolidate the Court of Appeal’s approach in considering registrability of trade-marks that refer to a geographic place which is the place of origin of the goods or services associated with the trade-mark.

 

 

 

Order prohibiting Google from delivering search results heads to SCC

The Supreme Court of Canada has agreed to hear an appeal from a decision of the B.C. Court of Appeal which upheld a worldwide injunction against Google Inc. (“Google”), wherein Google was ordered to stop delivering search results to its users that pointed to certain websites.

You can find my commentary on the B.C. Court of Appeal’s decision in Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Google Inc., 2015 BCCA 265, here.

The facts underlying the appeal arose from Equustek Solutions Inc.’s (“Equustek”) attempts to enforce its intellectual property rights against a former distributor, Datalink Technologies Gateways Inc. (“Datalink”).  Allegedly, Datalink was passing off Equustek’s products as its own and using Equustek’s confidential information and trade secrets to manufacture a competing product.  Equustek was successful in obtaining various interlocutory orders against Datalink; however, Datalink failed to comply with those orders, and continued “clandestine” operations online to market and sell its infringing products.

In order to more effectively stop Datalink’s infringing activities, Equustek sought an injunction against Google (which was not a party to the dispute), restraining it from publishing search results that included Datalink’s websites, on the basis that this was the only way to give effect to the orders already in place.  The B.C. Supreme Court granted the order, and the B.C. Court of Appeal upheld the order on appeal.

In its brief reasons granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada outlined the issues for its consideration:

–          Under what circumstances may a court order a search engine to block search results, having regard to the interest in access to information and freedom of expression, and what limits (either geographic or temporal) must be imposed on those orders?

–          Do Canadian courts have the authority to block search results outside of Canada’s borders?

–          Under what circumstances, if any, is a litigant entitled to an interlocutory injunction against a non-party that is not alleged to have done anything wrong?

Whatever the Supreme Court of Canada decides in this matter will hopefully provide direction and clarify the law regarding the ability of a Canadian Court to grant a worldwide injunction, as well as with respect to access to information and freedom of expression in the digital age.

We will keep you updated.

Save the Date: the Importance of the Date of First Use in Canadian Trade-mark Applications (for now)

A recent decision of the Canadian Trade-marks Opposition Board, Constellation Brands Québec Inc. c Sociedad Vinícola Miguel Torres, S.A., 2016 TMOB 4 (“Miguel Torres”), serves as a reminder of the importance of stating an accurate and supportable date of first use, when claiming use as a basis for registration in Canada.

In Miguel Torres, the Applicant filed an application to register the trade-mark HEMISFERIO (the “Mark”) for “wines”, claiming use in Canada since at least as early as October 28, 2011.  As one of its grounds of opposition, the Opponent alleged that the Applicant had not used the Mark in Canada as of the claimed date of first use.

As support for its claimed date of first use, the key piece of evidence relied upon by the Applicant was an invoice dated October 28, 2011, which purportedly corroborated the date of first use asserted by the Applicant’s affiant.  However, the Opposition Board instead agreed with the Opponent’s submission that while the invoice was dated October 28, 2011 and goods were shipped to Canada from Chile on that date, the approximate date of arrival in Canada of those goods was not until January 26, 2012.

Accordingly, because transfer of the property in or possession of the wine bearing the Mark from the Applicant to its Canadian distributors did not take place in Canada until after October 28, 2011, there was no “use” of the Mark in Canada, within the meaning of Section 4(1) of the Trade-marks Act (the “Act”), as of the date of first use claimed in the application.  The application was therefore refused.

While we understand that there will no longer be a need to claim a date of first use in trade-mark applications once the Canadian trade-mark regime changes (likely in 2018), for the time being, trade-mark applicants should strive to claim a date of first use that is accurate and, where possible, supported by documentary evidence.