Beer, Trademarks and the Jurisdiction of the Opposition Board

Molson Canada 2005 v. Anheuser-Busch, Incorporated, a decision of the Federal Court and another case in an ongoing “beer war”, provides an interesting analysis of the jurisdiction of the Opposition Board. The Opponent before the Opposition Board, Molson, through a predecessor in title, held the registered trademark for the label for Standard Lager:

Standard Lager Mark

(“the Standard Lager Mark”) a beer continuously sold in Canada since 1926, but almost exclusively in the province of Manitoba. Anheuser-Busch, the Applicant before the Opposition Board, had two labels that were registered as trade-marks:

Registered Anheuser-Busch Marks

(“the Registered Anheuser-Busch Marks”). The opposition arose when Anheuser-Busch sought to register an “updated” version of its two previously registered marks (“the Proposed Anheuser-Busch Marks”).

The Federal Court reviewed the litigation history arising in respect of the earlier registered marks, including a 1986 Federal Court of Appeal decision, Carling O’Keefe Breweries of Canada Ltd. v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., which concluded that the Standard Lager Mark and the Registered Anheuser-Busch Marks were confusing, that there was some sort of impropriety when the Standard Lager Mark was originally registered in 1929 since it was inspired by and designed with knowledge of the BUDWEISER label, but Carling (Molson’s predecessor in title) could rely on the equitable defence of laches and thus there was no basis for expunging either the Standard Lager Mark or the Registered Anheuser-Busch Marks.

The Opposition Board allowed the registration of the Proposed Anheuser-Busch Mark as it applied to clothing since Molson had not established that the ambit of protection accorded to the Standard Lager Mark included wares other than beer. With regards to use in association with beer the Opposition Board determined that it could limit the scope of protection afforded the Standard Lager Mark since the Court of Appeal had determined it was wrongfully obtained. Thus, Molson’s opposition with regards to use in association with beer was rejected.

The Federal Court disagreed and allowed the opposition with regards to use in association with beer. The Court was particularly concerned that the Opposition Board had exceeded its jurisdiction, since it is limited in an opposition proceeding to determining if a trademark is or is not registrable. Thus, for example, if there is a confusing mark on the register, the new mark cannot be registered. However, if the existing registration of an invalid trademark is interfering with the registration of a new trademark, it is up to the applicant for the new mark to take the necessary steps, usually an expungement application to the Federal Court, to get the register corrected. In an opposition proceeding, the validity of an opponent’s registered mark is not in issue.

The Federal Court was concerned that the Opposition Board could not limit the ambit of protection afforded the Standard Lager Mark on the basis that the Court of Appeal had questioned the lawfulness of the registration. Indeed, the Court of Appeal had not found the registration of the Standard Lager Mark was unlawful, but had instead found that the registration was not a nullity. Thus, Molson was relying on a valid registration and the question to be answered was whether the Proposed Anheuser-Busch Mark was confusing with the Standard Lager Mark. The Federal Court concluded they were confusing, applying the test in section 6(5) of the Trade-marks Act and giving particular weight to two surrounding circumstances: (1) that the Court of Appeal had found the Registered Anheuser-Busch Marks confusing; and (2) an acknowledgement in the Memorandums of Fact and Law filed by both the parties that the marks were confusing.

The beer wars continue and we may very well see an appeal.

Municipality’s rights in name not retroactive under CDRP: westkelowna.ca

In District of West Kelowna v. Baremetal.com Inc. the District of West Kelowna (the “Municipality”) lost a Canadian Internet Registration Authority (CIRA) Dispute Resolution Policy (CDRP) proceeding involving the domain name westkelowna.ca, to an alleged cybersquatter.

On April 2, 2007, Baremetal.com Inc. (the “Registrant”), apparently operated by a businessman living in the Municipality, registered the domain name westkelowna.ca. Subsequently, on January 29, 2009, in response to an opinion poll, the Municipality legally changed its name from “Westside District Municipality” to the “District of West Kelowna”. The Municipality contacted the Registrant to request a transfer of the domain name, but the Registrant refused. As a result, the Municipality filed a complaint under the CDRP in an attempt to gain control of the domain name.

To succeed in a CDRP proceeding, Section 4.1 of the CDRP Policy provides that the Complainant must prove that:

(a) the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to a mark in which the Complainant had rights prior to the date of registration of the disputed domain name,

(b) the Registrant has registered the domain in bad faith,

and the Complainant must provide some evidence that:

(c) the Registrant has no legitimate interest in the domain name.

Even if the Complainant proves (a) and (b) and provides some evidence of (c), the Registrant will succeed in the proceeding if the Registrant proves, on a balance of probabilities, that the Registrant has a legitimate interest in the domain name.

In this case, the Complainant Municipality didn’t even make it out of the gate, as the Panel found that the Municipality did not have prior rights in the mark “West Kelowna”. Under CIRA’s Municipal Name Registration Policy, a municipality’s name is generally reserved for the use of that municipality; however, the Panel found that unless a municipal name is specifically listed in the Canadian Geographical Names Database (CGNDB) at the time of the domain name reservation, the name is not reserved for the use of the municipality. The Municipality also failed to provide sufficient evidence that it had rights in the mark due to use of the mark prior to the registration of the domain name.

As a result, the complaint was dismissed. The Panel did, however, refuse the Registrant’s request for costs, finding that the Municipality had not made the complaint in bad faith.

Stripes Applied to Toothpaste: A Registrable Trademark

In Procter & Gamble Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Canada Inc. the Federal Court agreed with the Opposition Board that none of the six grounds advanced by Procter & Gamble, the opponent, could succeed against Colgate-Palmolive’s application to register its Striped Toothpaste Design – Green/White/Blue Stripes (the “Design”).

Three of the grounds advanced are of interest:

(1) that the Design was not registrable as of the filing date of the application (1994) because the Design was being applied to the wares for the purpose of decoration only and not for the purpose of distinguishing the applicant’s wares;

(2) that the Design was not registrable as of the filing date because the Design was primarily functional and registration would give Colgate-Palmolive a monopoly on functional elements or characteristics (i.e. stripes) of toothpaste; and Read more

No Summary Expungement of Trademark if Sublicensing Properly Documented

In Tucumcari Aero, Inc. v. Cassels, Brock & Blackwell LLP, a section 45 summary expungement action, the Registrar was satisfied that Tucumcari Aero, Inc., the owner of the trademark MOTO MIRROR & Design, had established use of the mark in association with truck and commercial vehicle mirrors. However, the Registrar also concluded that the evidence regarding the licences in place and Tucumcari’s control over the character and quality of the wares was ambiguous.

On appeal to the Federal Court the central issue was whether Tucumcari had filed sufficient additional evidence regarding its licensing arrangements, which involved a licensee and sublicensee, so as to establish that it had control over the character and quality of the wares. The Respondent agreed that sublicensing was permitted under section 50(1) of the Trade-marks Act, but argued that the indirect control contemplated by the Act required an express condition in the sublicensing agreement requiring the registrant to determine whether the character and quality of the wares are maintained. The Court disagreed, holding that the  registrant’s control of its contractual rights through the intermediary was sufficient and express language was not required.

The Court was also satisfied that an express provision authorizing sublicensing was not required and, even if Tucumcari had not specifically agreed to the sublicensing, there was evidence it had acquiesced. Moreover, a provision that allowed the sublicensee to ultimately buy the trade-mark did not mean Tucumcari was not using the mark in the interim, since it retained ownership and had an interest in preserving the goodwill until such time as it ultimately assigned its interests.

Special Circumstances Excuse Non-Use of Trademark

Cobalt Brands, LLC v. Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP concerned the registration of the mark USQUAEBACH & Design for use in association with blended Scotch Whiskey. The mark was registered in 1977 by a U.S. company which suspended production and sales in 2003 after the death of two owners holding a 95% interest. Van Caem, a Dutch liquor company and creditor, acquired the mark and assigned it to its Belgian subsidiary, but the owner of Van Caem died and Van Caem and its subsidiaries were forced to liquidate, which involved a lengthy process. The registered owner, Cobalt Brands, purchased the mark in 2007 and the assignment to Cobalt Brands was recorded by the Registrar. However, the section 45 expungement notice sent by the Registrar was not received by Cobalt Brands and the Registrar expunged the registration.

Cobalt Brands appealed. Cobalt Brands agreed the mark had fallen into disuse, but argued that special circumstances excused the non-use and the Court agreed.

The Court noted that Cobalt Brands was not prohibited from adducing evidence before the Federal Court simply because none was produced before the Registrar and that it was entitled to produce more than one affidavit. Read more

A Confusing Trademark VIBE

In Vibe Media Group LLC v. Lewis Craig Trading as VIBETRAIN the Federal Court of Canada set aside a decision of the Opposition Board and allowed the opposition to the application to register the mark VIBETRAIN.  The application was based on proposed use in Canada in association with wares and services that included sound recordings, printed promotional materials, magazines, clothing and souvenir items and entertainment services involving the provision of musical and entertainment performances in live, television, video and Internet media.  The opponent was a company with which Quincy Jones had an association and held the trademark rights, including an application and two pending applications, for VIBE, a popular magazine focusing on urban culture.

The Opposition Board member found that “vibe” was not inherently distinctive, relying on an earlier decision of the Court, Vibe Ventures LLC v. 3681441 Canada Inc.  The Board also found that VIBETRAIN consisted of two ordinary dictionary words that were disconnected from their respective meanings and which, when juxtaposed, were inherently distinctive.  The Board member referred to the Oxford English Dictionary for the definition of “vibe”.  Before the Court, the  Opponent argued that other dictionaries did not define “vibe” and it was therefore not an ordinary dictionary word.

On appeal, the Court found that “vibe” may no longer be inherently distinctive, but through continuous use it had become suggestive of the Opponent’s magazine, something the Board had acknowledged in its decision.  The Opponent also submitted new evidence on the appeal to show that the word “train” suggested a series of musical performances, that no other magazine titles in Canada began with VIBE and that VIBE had been used in Canada with programs, websites, books and recordings related to music.

The Court concluded there was a broad overlap in the music, culture and clothing wares and services that the VIBE and VIBETRAIN trademarks sought to identify, as well as similar channels of trade, since both targeted people with an interest in music, entertainment and culture.  Thus, there was a likelihood of confusion for a “casual consumer somewhat in a hurry”.

Confusing CANNABIS CULTURE

The Friendly Stranger Corporation v. Avalon Sunsplash Ltd.was an appeal of a decision of the Trade-marks Opposition Board refusing several trademark applications filed by the Applicant.  The Applicant sells products related to hemp and marijuana through its Toronto store, The Friendly Stranger Cannabis Culture Shop, and sought to register CANNABIS CULTURE SHOP, CANNABIS CULTURE SHOP & Design and FRIENDLY STRANGER CANNABIS CULTURE SHOP & Design.  The Opponent, Avalon Sunsplash Ltd., publishes a bi-monthly magazine called “Cannabis Culture”, operates a store in Vancouver and maintains a website at cannabisculture.com.

The Opposition Board had concluded that “the distinctiveness of the Opponent’s mark was sufficient to negate the distinctiveness of the applied for mark”.  Notwithstanding additional evidence filed on appeal, the Federal Court agreed, noting the similarity of the wares and services, and that the only difference between the Applicant’s mark, CANNABIS CULTURE SHOP, and the Opponent’s mark, CANNABIS CULTURE was the use of the word “shop”, which was not in itself inherently distinctive.

The Opposition Board had also refused FRIENDLY STRANGER CANNABIS CULTURE SHOP on a balance of probabilities, since it resembled the Opponent’s mark and both parties targeted the same market.  However, the Federal Court was satisfied that this mark should be allowed since additional evidence shifted the emphasis to the words “Friendly Stranger” from “Cannabis Culture Shop”.

The Court also considered section 6(2) of the Trade-marks Act, which provides that a trademark causes confusion with another trademark if the use of both trademarks in the same area would lead to the inference that the wares or services associated with the trademarks are marketed by the same person.  On this point the Court referenced the finding in United Artist Corp. v. Pink Panther Beauty Corp. [1998] F.C.J. No. 441 that “the question posed by [section 6(2)] does not concern the confusion of the marks, but confusion of goods or services from one source as being from another source”.  Although the wares of the parties were similar, the Court was satisfied there was also no confusion as to source since the marketplaces were very different.  Friendly Stranger Cannabis Culture shop had a strong presence in Toronto, while the Opponent’s marketplace was Vancouver.  Moreover, the internet sales were only a small fraction of what was sold in the stores and the domain names of the parties were very different.  Presumably, if the Opponent had had a stronger internet presence the Court might have found confusion on the basis of section 6(2) since it would have then been difficult to differentiate the “marketplaces” in Vancouver and Toronto.  However, this was not the case.